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Introduction
LANGUAGE IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT in the two fields at the
center of this Article. Language is the tool of the legal profession,1
and feminists recognize that language has been an instrument of both
women's oppression and their liberation.2 This Article considers a
question relevant to both fields: Are judges using gender-neutral lan-
guage? For lawyers, the answer may inform their choice of wording
when they write for judges.3 For feminists, the answer will be one
marker of the success of their efforts in language reform.
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1. See, e.g., FRANK E. COOPER, WRITING IN LAW PRAcTICE 1 (1963) ("[L]awyers have
but one tool-language."); DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw, at vii (1963)
("The law is a profession of words."); Debra R. Cohen, Competent Legal Wrting-A Lauryer's
Professional Responsibility, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 491, 492 (1999) ("To provide competent repre-
sentation, a lawyer must communicate effectively.").
2. ANNE PAUWELS, WOMEN CHANGING LANGUAGE 87 (1998) [hereinafter PAUWELS,
CHANGING LANGUAGE] (stating that for those who would reform gender-biased language,
"[1]anguage is seen as both an instrument of oppression and liberation").
3. SeeJudith S. Kaye, A BriefforGender-NeutralBrief-Witing, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 21, 1991, at
2 (stating that using gender-biased language may annoy or alienate brief readers, including
judges and their staffs).
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In 1991, New York judge Judith Kaye wrote that her state's courts
were making progress in adopting gender-neutral writing.4 Two years
later, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court observed that although gender-neutral language had become
widespread in legal academia, the courts were "lagging behind the
academy" on that score.5 But little data exists to quantify the accuracy
of either statement.6 This Article examines what courts are actually
doing through an empirical study of federal appellate judges' use of
gender-neutral language.
The first part of this Article provides background about the
meaning of the terms gender-biased and gender-neutral and discusses the
contemporary movement to promote gender-neutral language. The
second part explains, through the viewpoints of language scholars,
psychologists, framing theorists, and legal professionals, why gender-
neutral language is important. The third part suggests methods for
framing gender-neutral language. The fourth part presents the meth-
odology and results of the study, analyzing language in recent court
opinions and comparing data from the years 1965 and 2006. The final
part discusses implications and conclusions.
I. Gender-Neutral Language: Background
Consider this quotation:
One may be saddened but not surprised at the statement "man is
the only primate that commits rape." ... But "man being a mam-
mal breastfeeds his young" is taken as a joke.7
This 'joke" is humorous-or vexing-because it illustrates a
quirk of the English language. Until recently, grammarians would
have agreed that, in English, the masculine includes the feminine;
that is, male-linked words can sometimes act as generics. 8 But the quo-
4. Id.
5. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Toward a Courtroom of One's Own: An Appellate Court Judge
Looks at Gender Bias, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1209, 1218 (1993) (recounting how both male and
female speakers at the American Association of Law Schools conference often use gender-
neutral language). But see Pat Chew & Lauren K. Kelley-Chew, Subtly Sexist Language, 16
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 643, 667-68 (2007) (reporting data showing that law reviews, the
authors of which are often members of legal academia, have made some progress toward
adopting gender neutral language, but they have made less progress than judges and
lawyers).
6. See Chew & Kelley-Chew, supra note 5, at 645 (noting the dearth of such data and
reporting results of their recent study of several types of legal writing).
7. CASEY MILLER & KATE SWIFT, WORDS AND WOMEN 25-26 (1976).
8. Sandra Petersson, Gender Neutral Drafting: Historical Perspective, 19 STATUTE L. REv.
93, 102 (1998) (explaining that until recently, the generic "he" was taught to English
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tation above illustrates that the masculine never did unambiguously
include the feminine. Instead of including all persons, masculine
"false generics"9 reduce women "to the status of the 'subsumed,' the
'invisible,' or the 'marked' one[s]."'10
Such false generics are one kind of gender-biased language. In
this Article, gender-biased language, which is sometimes called sexist lan-
guage or exclusive language, means language that represents the male as
the norm,II gratuitously identifies the sex of a referent, or demeans or
trivializes women.1 2 Its opposite, gender-neutral language, sometimes
called nonsexist language13 or gender-inclusive language,14 avoids gender
bias. These definitions focus on bias in favor of the masculine be-
cause, although gender-biased language can be directed against
speakers); Francine Wattman Frank, Language Planning, Language Reform, and Language
Change: A Review of Guidelines for Nonsexist Usage, in LANGUACE, GENDER, AND PROFESSIONAL
WRITING: THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND GUIDELINES FOR NONSEXIST USAGE 105, 114-15
(Francine Wattman Frank & Paula A. Treichler eds., 1988) (discussing grammarians' ratio-
nale for prescribing sex-indefinite masculine pronouns).
9. CAsEv MILLER & KATE SwiFT, THE HANDBOOK OF NONSEXIST WRITING 9, 12-13
(1980) (pointing out that women are overlooked through "false generics"); Anne Pauwels,
Linguistic Sexism and Feminist Linguistic Activism, in THE HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND GEN-
DER 550, 553 (Janet Holmes & Miriam Meyerhoff eds., 2003) [hereinafter Pauwels, Linguis-
tic Sexism] ("[W]omen are invisible in language when they are subsumed in generic
expressions using masculine forms.").
10. Pauwels, Linguistic Sexism, supra note 9, at 553; see also DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE
LANGUAGE 162 (2d ed. 1985) (stating that in English, "women have been encoded as invisi-
ble"); DEBORAH TANNEN, GENDER AND DISCOURSE 11 (1994) (stating that women and men
have differing communication styles that "often put women in a subordinate position in
interactions with men").
11. See Janet B. Parks & Mary Ann Roberton, Explaining Age and Gender Effects on Atti-
tudes Toward Sexist Language, 24J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 401, 402 (2005) (citing stud-
ies showing that "sexist language can suggest that the masculine is the norm and the
feminine is the exception"); PAUWELS, CHANGING LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 13 (stating
that in gender-biased language, "practices and usage express a bias against women in
favo[r] of men"); BOBBYE D. SORRELS, THE NONSEXIST COMMUNICATOR 1 (1983) ("Broadly
defined, sexist communication precasts either females or males into roles on the basis of
sex alone.").
12. See MILLER & Swiir, supra note 7, at 51 (arguing against "suffix words used to
introduce an irrelevant sexual distinction" (emphasis added)); Parks & Roberton, supra note
11, at 402 (defining sexist language as "words, phrases, and expressions that unnecessarily
differentiate between women and men or exclude, trivialize, or diminish either gender"
(internal citation omitted)).
13. See, e.g., William B. Hill, A Need for the Use of Nonsexist Language in the Courts, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 276 (1992) ("Nonsexist, genderless, gender free and gender
neutral are terms descriptive of language that includes both men and women, rather than
excludes women.").
14. See Cheryl B. Preston, This Old House: A Blueprint for Constructive Feminism, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2271, 2296-97 (1995) (using the term "gender-inclusive language").
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males, it is most often directed against women, and its negative effects
are typically experienced by women. 15
A. Gender as an Attribute of Language
Many of the world's languages employ grammatical gender sys-
tems.16 The term gender has its roots in the Old French word gendre,
which simply meant kind.17 For linguists, "[g]enders are classes of
nouns reflected in the behavior of associated words."' 8 While gram-
matical gender may have some connection to sex, the two categories
are not coextensive, 19 and in some languages gender labels have little
connection to sex. 20 In other languages, called "semantic" or "natural
gender systems," grammatical gender is determined by the sex of the
word's referent.21 These differences mean that eliminating gender
bias is fraught with its own special problems in each language. 22 Be-
cause this Article covers American judges, it focuses on the English
language, which is a natural gender system.23
B. Gender Bias in the English Language
Gender-biased language manifests itself in three ways in English.
The first is through male-linked words that are used in a pseudo-ge-
15. Janet B. Parks & Mary Ann Roberton, Attitudes Toward Women Mediate the Gender
Effect on Attitudes Toward Sexist Language, 28 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 233, 233 (2004) ("Al-
though sexist language can be directed toward men, studies in English-speaking cultures
have established that its deleterious and disempowering effects typically accrue to women."
(internal citation omitted)).
16. GREVILLE G. CORBETr, GENDER 1-2 (1991).
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike English, some other languages re-
quire that articles and adjectives agree in gender with the nouns they modify. Pauwels,
Linguistic Sexism, supra note 9, at 556-59.
19. CORBETr, supra note 16, at 1 (calling gender "the most puzzling of the grammati-
cal categories").
20. PAUWELS, CHANGING LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 37-38.
21. Id.
22. See DEBORAH CAMERON, FEMINISM AND LINGUISTIC THEORY 6 (2d ed. 1992) ("[T]he
challenge to sexist language could and can be found among speakers of many languages,
including French, German, Dutch, Italian and Japanese."); ANN WEATHERALL, GENDER,
LANGUAGE AND DIscOURsE 11 (2002) (stating that sexist language has been an issue for
speakers of many languages); Graham Martin, iWen Is a 'Manageress' a 'Manager'? Ap-
proaches to Gender-Neutral Language Use in Five West European Languages, 40 LINGUIST 80,
80-83 (2001) (discussing efforts at gender-neutral language in English, French, Spanish,
Italian, and German); Pauwels, Linguistic Sexism, supra note 9, at 556-59 (discussing specific
difficulties in the use of gender-neutral terms in Dutch, German, French, and Spanish).
23. PAUWELS, CHANGING LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 37.
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neric sense.24 This includes using nouns like man and mankind to refer
to both females and males, as in the following sentence: "[M]an needs
food."25
The pseudo-generic masculine also occurs in the ger~dered third-
person-singular pronouns he, him, and his,2 6 which cause what has
been termed "the pronoun problem."27 When these pronouns refer to
identified persons, they do not meet this Article's definition of gender
bias because they do not present the masculine as the norm. A prob-
lem arises, however, when a writer needs a pronoun to refer to a per-
son of unspecified sex, as in this example: "An attorney should
present his argument in plain English." This use of the masculine pro-
noun is inaccurate for the legal field, which is now composed of about
one-third women, 28 and it illustrates how pseudo-generic terms treat
the masculine as the norm by omitting express reference to the femi-
nine. Women are thus "eliminated from language, and consequently
from thought and reality."29
Many English speakers are not aware that the pseudo-generic
masculine is of rather late invention: male grammarians promulgated
it in the eighteenth century. 30 Concerned about the growing accept-
ance of they as a singular pronoun, grammarians proposed to solve
that problem through a generic masculine that would include both
the male and the female. 31 Significantly, in trying to fix the lack of
24. See Frank, supra note 8, at 119 (using the term "pseudogenerics" to refer to male-
linked terms that purportedly include persons of both sexes).
25. SPENDER, supra note 10, at 152.
26. DENNIS BARON, GRAMMAR AND GENDER 98 (1986) ("[G]ender agreement in En-
glish occurs not between adjective and noun but in the pronoun system, specifically the
third person pronoun."); Martin, supra note 22, at 80 (explaining that in English, a major
focus of the language revolution has been on personal pronouns).
27. See Beverly Ray Burlingame, Comment, Reaction and Distraction: The Pronoun Prob-
lem in Legal Persuasion, 1 SCRIBES J. LEG. WRITING 87, 87 (1990).
28. ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 14 (2001); see also SoRRELs, supra note 11, at 2 (arguing that sexist
language is inappropriate partly because many occupations formerly staffed by men now
include women).
29. SPENDER, supra note 10, at 157.
30. MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 9, at 36 ("Not until the eighteenth century did a 'rule'
mandating ... usage [of the generic he] appear in an English grammar book, and not until
the nineteenth century was it widely taught."); SPENDER, Supra note 10, at 148 (stating that
in 1746, grammarian John Kirby formulated a rule that "the male gender was more compre-
hensive than the female"); Ann Bodine, Androcentrism in Prescriptive Grammar: Singular
"They," Sex-Indefinite "He," and "He or She," in The Feminist Critique of Language 166, 172
(Deborah Cameron ed., 1990) (explaining that prescriptive grammarians established the
"sex-indefinite 'he'" only two and a half centuries ago).
31. MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 9, at 36.
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number agreement in the singular use of they, these grammarians cre-
ated another problem of agreement-this time in gender.3 2 Theyjus-
tified this on the premise that the masculine comprehends, or
includes, the feminine,3 3 dismissing the omission of the feminine as
unimportant.3 4 Anthropologist Ann Bodine contends that this reflects
the grammarians' "androcentric worldview. ''35 Bodine showed that the
generic masculine took firm hold in the teaching of English grammar.
In 1975, she surveyed American junior and senior high school gram-
mar books and found that nearly all of them mandated the generic
masculine.3 6
A second type of gendered language in English is gender-marked
terminology. Gendered kinship terms like mother and father legiti-
mately describe roles based on sex. 37 However, other words like wait-
ress, chairman, and chairwoman are unnecessarily gender-marked. 38
When persons of both sexes perform the same functions, calling at-
tention to their sex in this way is gratuitous.39 Such gendered terms
"often make women invisible, treat them as secondary or have a trivial-
ising effect on the linguistic portrayal of women." 40 These terms can
be replaced with more neutral words,41 like server and chair.42
The titles Miss and Mrs. create a unique problem because they
identify a woman's marital status. These terms have no counterparts
for men, for whom Mr. applies to both the married and the unmar-
32. Bodine, supra note 30, at 170.
33. Id. at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. MILLER & SwIFT, supra note 9, at 36.
35. Bodine, supra note 30, at 171; see a/soJulia P. Stanley, Sexist Grammar, 39 C. ENG.
800, 800 (1978) (observing that English grammar rules "were [historically] written by men
for the edification of other men, and, as such, they deal with male concerns from a male
point of view").
36. Bodine, supra note 30, at 177 (reporting that the textbooks recommended the
generic masculine instead of pronoun pairs like he or she).
37. See MILLER & SwIFT, supra note 7, at 51.
38. See id. (noting that many gendered terms "introduce an irrelevant sexual
distinction").
39. See Parks & Roberton, supra note 11, at 401 (noting that terms like "drum major"
and "majorette" are "hierarchic and separatist").
40. PAUWELS, CHANGING LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 43; see also Ann Weatherall, Women
and Men in Language, 25 HuM. COMM. RF.s. 275, 277 (1998) (stating that biased language
"conceal[s] the existence and importance of women as a social group" (internal citation
omitted)).
41. For further resources and suggestions on changing gender-marked language, see
discussion infra Part III.
42. But see Michael Levin, Vs. Ms., in SEXis-r LANGUAGE 217, 217-22 (Mary Vetterling-
Braggin ed., 1981) (objecting to calling persons "chairs"); William Safire, On Language;
Genderese, N.Y. TIMEs, May 16, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (objecting to replacing "chair-
man" with "chair" because it "sound[s] four-legged").
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ried. The implicit suggestion is that a woman's marital status is every-
one's business, while a man's is not.4 3 To move beyond that biased
assumption, feminists promoted the use of Ms., which, like Mr., does
not identify marital status. 44 Its wide acceptance has been one of the
most successful aspects of the effort to promote nonsexist language.
Although Ms. has not universally replaced the older terms, it is now
commonly used.45
A third type of gender-biased language arises from the user's own
choice and sometimes consists of repeating old, formulaic phrasing.
This includes references to men and women in nonparallel terms, like
man and wife.46 It may also involve referring to women in terms that
demean or trivialize them, such as calling an adult woman a "girl" or
"honey." As linguist Deborah Cameron has explained, when used by
non-intimates, such terms "are inherently disrespectful. They are a
unilateral declaration by the man that he need not trouble about the
formalities expected between non-intimates. 47
Within recent memory, judges have addressed women in the
courtroom with such terms, including "little girl" and "honey. '48 Simi-
43. See PAUWELS, CHANGING LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 59 ("This discriminatory prac-
tice is said to mark the availability of women in terms of marriage (sex) and reinforces the
view that a woman is the property of a man (either her father or her husband).").
44. See L.M. Purdy, Against "Vs. Ms.," in SEXIST LANGUAGE, supra note 42, at 227 (Mary
Vetterling-Braggin ed., 1981) (discussing "Miss" and "Mrs.," and advocating the use of
"Ms."). But see Levin, supra note 42, at 222 ("In the human species Man is the aggressor and
Woman the accepter. Hence a man has to know, when encountering a new female, if she is
eligible for his overtures. A woman need know nothing similar of a new man, since she is
not the one responsible for the initiation.").
45. See BARON, supra note 26, at 167-72; see also id. at 172 (observing in 1986 that
"[m]any women have adopted [Ms.] as the title of choice").
46. See MILLER & SwIvr, supra note 9, at 85-87 (noting that gendered nonparallel
pairs "always seem[ ] to work one way: at women's expense").
47. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 106; see also ROBIN LAKoFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S
PLACE 25 (1975) [hereinafter LAKorr, WOMAN's PLACE] (noting that calling an adult wo-
man a "girl" suggests that she is immature and irresponsible); see also Ann Bartow, Some
Dumb Girl Syndrome: Challenging and Subverting Destructive Stereotypes of Female Attorneys, II
WM. & MARxJ. WOMEN & L. 221, 259 (2005) (observing that calling an adult woman "the
girl" or "my girl" indicates that she is subordinate).
48. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUS-
TICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: FINAL REPORT 61 (Gay Danforth &
Bobbie L. Welling eds., 1996), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/access/
documents/f-report.pdf (reporting that "[w]itnesses too numerous to mention cited in-
stances of... [judges calling them] 'honey' or some other familiar term usually reserved
for members of one's family. . .."); Gender Bias in the Courts of the Commonwealth Final Report,
7 Wm. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 705, 738 (2001) [hereinafter Gender Bias Final Report] (re-
porting that one judge addressed woman lawyers as "missy-miss"); John C. Coughenour et
al., The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias
Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 812 (1994) (reporting that some attorney respondents in
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larly trivializing references appeared in past judicial opinions; two
nineteenth-century judges used patronizing terminology in holding
that women should not be admitted to the practice of law. Justice
Bradley wrote in a concurrence to a United States Supreme Court
opinion of the "natural and proper timidity and delicacy" of women, 49
and a Wisconsin judge opined that "[w] omanhood is moulded for
gentler and better things" than the legal profession.50 Law professor
Deborah Rhode recently observed that due to increased conscious-
ness about demeaning language, the use of such trivializing terms is
no longer common. 51
C. The Movement for Gender-Neutral Language
The gender bias in the English language was confronted sporadi-
cally before the twentieth century. For example, in the late nineteenth
century both Julia Smith52 and Elizabeth Cady Stanton 53 rewrote the
Bible in gender-neutral language. But a concerted movement for
widespread change arose only in the late 1960s, as the second wave of
the women's movement gathered momentum. 5 4 Feminists in the
United States began to promote gender-neutral language as "trailblaz-
ers in both exposing sexist bias and proposing changes." 55
The latter part of the twentieth century saw an increase in the
trend toward gender-neutral language in English.5 6 As professionals in
various fields began to adopt it, gender-neutral language appeared in
employment advertising, textbooks, popular media, dictionaries, 57
a Ninth Circuit survey said federal judges had addressed them as "young lady" or "little
girl"); Nancy Blodgett, "I Don't Think that Ladies Should Be Lawyers," 72 A.B.A. J. 48, 51
(1986) (reporting that a New York judge called a courtroom lawyer "little girl").
49. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
50. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875).
51. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED
AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 20 (2001).
52. See Frank, supra note 8, at 128 (referring to Julia Smith's 1876 feminist Bible).
53. See Tracy A. Thomas, Elizabeth Cady Stanton on the Federal Marriage Amendment: A
Letter to the President, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 137, 153-54 (2005) (citing ELIZABETH CADY STAN-
TON, THE WOMAN'S BIBLE (1896), and recounting how Stanton rewrote the Bible "using a
feminist lens").
54. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 9 (stating that feminists began examining sexism in
language "during the late 1960s and 1970s"); Frank, supra note 8, at 118 ("The reawaken-
ing and growth of the feminist movement in the late 1960s and 1970s rekindled interest in
the question of language and gender.").
55. Pauwels, Linguistic Sexism, supra note 9, at 552.
56. Id. at 563-65.
57. PAUWELS, CHANGING LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 203-09 (documenting changes in
these areas).
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and religious publications. 58 Studies reported a decline in the use of
masculine nouns and pronouns as generics, 5 9 with one study finding a
notable decline in their use in American newspapers and magazines
between 1971 and 1979.60 A 1993 news article reported anecdotal evi-
dence that New York judges' choices of language were "a sign of how
mainstream the cause of 'inclusive language' has become 30 years af-
ter the feminist movement of the 1960s."61 As one scholar observed,
"We are becoming less and less able to envision females when male
terminology is used. '62
Some commentators object to the movement for gender-neutral
language.63 One of their objections is based on tradition: they argue
that entrenched language patterns should not be changed. 64 Student
subjects in a 1998 study who were largely supportive of gender-neutral
language cited tradition as the major reason for any remaining resis-
tance, mentioning both "the difficulty of change for the individual
and the pervasive influence of perceived tradition in [our] society."65
A second objection to gender-neutral language is that "the sexist lan-
guage problem is trivial. ' 66 A third is based on aesthetics, with an un-
derlying assumption that gender-neutral language must necessarily be
awkward. 67 A fourth objection is that gender-neutral language may an-
58. Id. at 31 (noting that feminist theologian Mary Daly has had a significant impact
on changing gender-biased language in religious expression).
59. Pauwels, Linguistic Sexism, supra note 9, at 563.
60. Robert L. Cooper, The Avoidance of Androcentric Generics, 50 INT'LJ. Soc. LANGUAGE
5, 11 (1984). Cooper found the greatest decline in androcentric generics in publications
"addressed to women and the well-educated." Id. at 19.
61. Deborah Pines, When 'She'Replaces 'He' at Foley Square, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at 1.
62. Preston, supra note 14, 2295-96.
63. See Maija S. Blaubergs, An Analysis of Classic Arguments Against Changing Sexist Lan-
guage, 3 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L Q. 135, 136 (1980) (listing arguments advanced against
changing masculine generics); Frank, supra note 8, at 124 (stating that some negative reac-
tions have "taken the form of ridicule and satire"); Levin, supra note 42, at 222 (asserting
that nonsexist language reforms are "encroachments to resist"); Parks & Roberton, supra
note 11, at 401-02 (citing participants on both sides of the debate about gender-neutral
language).
64. See Frank, supra note 8, at 124-25 (citing appeals to tradition by opponents of
language reform); Janet B. Parks & Mary Ann Roberton, Contemporary Arguments Against
Nonsexist Language: Blaubergs (1980) Revisited, 39 SEx ROLES 445, 453 (1998) (citing appeals
to tradition by opponents of language reform).
65. Parks & Roberton, supra note 64, at 459.
66. Paula A. Treichler & Francine Wattman Frank, Preface to Guidelines for Nonsexist
Usage, in LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND PROFESSIONAL WRITING: THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND
GUIDELINES FOR NONSExisT USAGE 137, 137 (Francine Wattman Frank & Paula A. Treichler
eds., 1989).
67. Justice Antonin Scalia recently opined that gender-neutral language can create
awkward phrasing. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF
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noy readers who do not support it.68 The first two objections are coun-
tered in Part II, which explains why gender-neutral language is
important. Part III counters the third and fourth objections and
presents a variety of suggestions for writing graceful and unobtrusive
gender-neutral language.
H. Why Gender-Neutral Language Is Important
Scholars and commentators in several fields have shown that con-
cerns about biased language are far from trivial. Language scholars,
psychologists, and framing theorists have demonstrated that biased
language affects individuals' perceptions of themselves and the world.
Meanwhile, legal professionals have articulated the importance of
nonsexist language to fairness in the law and the clarity of legal
documents.
A. Language Scholars' Views
Casey Miller and Kate Swift, influential proponents of gender-
neutral language, alluded to a perhaps apocryphal research report en-
titled "Development of the Uterus in Rats, Guinea Pigs, and Men."69
By implying that male humans have uteruses, this title dramatizes what
language scholars' research has now solidly shown: that supposedly
generic male-linked words are often perceived as referring only to
males.70 For example, when students were asked to submit pictures of
subjects related to a sociology course, those given male-linked generic
titles like "urban man" thought more often of males than females and
PERSUADING JUDGES 119 (2008); see also Safire, supra note 42, at 30 (stating that gender-
neutral language "can pull the punch out of a good sentence," but acknowledging that
proponents of gender-neutral language sometimes "have indisputable logic on their side").
But see Treichler & Frank, supra note 66, at 141 (stating "convoluted alternatives almost
always signal a deeper problem and the need for further analysis in the writing or editing
process").
68. See Parks & Roberton, supra note 64, at 453 (noting some study subjects' object to
the use of gender-neutral language).
69. MILLER & Swl-r, supra note 9, at 9.
70. See William R.Todd-Mancillas, Masculine Generics=Sexist Language: A Review of the
Literature and Implications for Speech Communication Professionals, 29 COMM. Q. 107, 115
(1981) (summarizing fourteen studies showing that subjects "perceive 'man'-linked words
and third-person-singular masculine generics as referencing men more frequently than
women"); PAUWELS, CHANGING LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 71-73 (citing studies); Janet
Bing, Penguins Can't fy and Women Don't Count: Language and Thought, 15 WOMEN & LAN-
GUAGE 11 (1992) (same);John Gastil, Generic Pronouns and Sexist Language: The Oxymoronic
Character of Masculine Generics, 23 SEX ROLES 629, 630 (1990) (same); see also Parks &
Roberton, supra note 11, at 402 (discussing the impact of masculine-based language).
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were more likely to submit photographs of males only.71 In another
study, subjects were asked to describe the gender of persons referred
to by male-linked generic phrases like "[tlhe potentialities of man."72
In response to open-ended questions, 66% described males, 29% de-
scribed neither sex exclusively, and only 5% described females.73 Simi-
larly, John Gastil found that generic masculine pronouns evoked a
disproportionate number of male images.74
These studies document the impact of gender-biased language
on perceptions about women. It subtly creeps into the consciousness
of both women and men, burdening them with stereotypes about the
meaning of being female or male. 75 Gender-biased language "rein-
force [s] sexist attitudes and behaviors,"76 assigning "secondary status"
to females. 77 Thus, linguist Anne Pauwels concluded that gender-bi-
ased language "not only reflects but also helps to construct and per-
petuate a sexist reality." 7 8
B. Psychologists' and Social Scientists' Views
Scholars from the fields of psychology and social science have
corroborated language scholars' conclusions. Psychology professor
Laura Madson and Jennifer Shoda found that student subjects per-
ceived pseudo-generic masculine words as gender-biased, 79 and Mykol
Hamilton found that subjects hearing a story that used male-linked
generics saw male images more than female ones.80 Allen McConnell
and Russell Fazio's study of gender-marked language showed that
71. Todd-Mancillas, supra note 70, at 109 (citingJoseph W. Schneider & Sally Hacker,
Sex Role Imagery and the Use of the Generic 'Man' in Introductory Texts: A Case in the Sociology of
Sociology, 8 Am. SOCIOLOGIST 12-18 (1973)).
72. Id. (citing Virginia Kidd, A Study of the Images Produced Through the Use of the Male
Pronoun as the Generic, 1 MOMENTS CONTEMP. RHETORIC & COMM. 25 (1971)). Linguist
Grenville Corbett theorized that this occurs partly because in English, he appears three
times more often than she. CORBETT, supra note 16, at 221.
73. See sources cited supra note 72.
74. Gastil, supra note 70, at 638-39.
75. MILLER & SwiFr, supra note 7, at x; Parks & Roberton, supra note 11, at 402 (citing
studies).
76. Gastil, supra note 70, at 630.
77. MILLER & Swir, supra note 7, at x.
78. PAUWELS, CHANGING LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 92; see also Bing, supra note 70, at
11 (arguing that language affects thought).
79. Laura Madson & Jennifer Shoda, Alternating Between Masculine and Feminine Pro-
nouns: Does Essay Topic Affect Readers' Perceptions?, 54 SEx ROLES 275, 284 (2006).
80. Mykol C. Hamilton, Masculine Bias in the Attribution of Personhood, 15 PSYCHOL.
WOMEN Q. 393, 396-97 (1991).
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male-linked generic words were associated with masculine traits.8 1
They concluded that concerns about biased language are "grounded
in more than either esthetic or philosophical considerations but re-
flect[ ] psychological impact as well."' 2 Other studies from the social
sciences have reached similar conclusions.8 3 Gender-biased language
has even been shown to limit girls' views of their vocational options.8 4
As feminist Dale Spender stated, language "determines the limits of
our world, which constructs our reality."85 Gender-neutral language
more accurately reflects that reality.8 6
C. Framing Theorists' Views
While linguists and psychologists have documented the negative
effects of biased language, framing theory offers an explanation for
those effects. In the past few decades, framing theory has gained con-
siderable currency in several fields, including linguistics, sociology,
communication, and political science. 87 In his seminal book on frame
analysis, sociologist Erving Goffman defined frames as "schemata of
interpretation" through which users "locate, perceive, identify, and la-
bel" experience. 88 Frames, then, are mental structures, similar to pic-
ture frames, which define the perimeters of each individual's unique
focus. Political scientist James N. Druckman explained that a framing
effect occurs when, in describing an occurrence, a person's emphasis
on certain considerations causes others "to focus on these considera-
81. Allen R. McConnell & Russell H. Fazio, Women as Men and People: Effects of Gender-
Marked Language, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1004, 1011 (1996) (reporting
data showing that "gender-marked language can influence perceivers' judgments about a
target's personality characteristics").
82. Id.
83. See Madson & Shoda, supra note 79, at 275 (citing studies).
84. Parks & Roberton, supra note 11, at 402.
85. SPENDER, supra note 10, at 139.
86. See CAMERON, supra note 22, at 103 (stating that gender-neutral language is more
"into line with the way things really are").
87. See Barbara Gray, Framing of Environmental Disputes, in MAKING SENSE OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONFLICTS: FRAMES AND CASES 11, 13 (RoyJ. Lewicki, Barbara Gray & Michael Elli-
ott eds., 2003) ("Numerous definitions of frames have been provided by researchers in
cognitive psychology, microsociology, and sociolinguistics."); Robert D. Benford & David
Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REv. Soc.
611, 611 (2000) (citing scholars who have applied framing theory in the fields of cognitive
psychology, linguistics, communication, political science, and sociology); Deborah Tan-
nen, What's in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying Expectations, in FRAMING IN DISCOURSE
14, 15 (Deborah Tannen ed., 1993) (noting that framing theory has been applied in vari-
ous fields, including social psychology and linguistics).
88. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 21
(1974).
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tions when constructing their opinions."89 Mental frames are not al-
ways conscious, but they affect how we see our world, and they are
expressed through language. 90 According to sociolinguist Robin
Lakoff, "[W]e say things without knowing their significance, but the
fact that we have said them shows that there is more going on in our
minds than we consciously take credit for."9 1 This suggests that the
language in judges' opinions tells something about how they see the
world.
In addition to reflecting their own views, judges' language can
also influence their readers' cognitive schema. Prototype theory in
cognitive linguistics concerns how people categorize items. It holds
that "[c]ategorization is not a matter to be taken lightly," because it
influences people's thoughts. 92 Indeed, words can influence persons
"in a subliminal, subconscious way, doing their damage over a period
of time by reinforcing negative self-image."9 3 This ability of language
to alter thinking is the basis of a branch of framing theory that both
examines and develops political strategies.94 Even grammatical gender
has been shown to affect perceptions by prompting people to make
comparisons they would not otherwise have made. 95 Framing theory
shows that if judges use gender-biased language, they construct a
frame through which both women and men see men as the dominant
norm.96
89. James N. Druckman, On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?, 63 J. POL.
1041, 1042 (2001).
90. GEORGE LAKoFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT, at xv (2004) [hereinafter LAKoIF,
ELEPHANT] ("We . .. know frames through language.").
91. LAKOFF, WOMAN'S PLACE, supra note 47, at 1.
92. GEORGE LKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL
ABOUT THE MIND 5-6 (1987).
93. VAL DUMOND, THE ELEMENTS OF NONSEXIST USAGE: A GUIDE TO INCLUSIVE SPOKEN
AND WRITTEN ENGLISH 6 (1990).
94. See, e.g., LAKOFF, ELEPHANT, supra note 90, at 4 (providing examples of language
that has affected public opinion, and noting that "[firaming is about getting language that
fits your world view"); Thomas E. Nelson, Zoe M. Oxley & Rosalee A. Clawson, Toward a
Psychology of Framing Effects, 19 POL. BEHAV. 221, 224 (1997) ("Frames can be meaningful
and important determinants of public opinion.").
95. LERA BORODITSKY, LAUREN A. SCHMIDT & WEBB PHILLIPS, Sex, Syntax, and Semantics,
in LANGUAGE IN THE MIND 61, 74, 77 (Dedre Gentner & Susan Goldwin-Meadow eds.,
2003); see also Nayda Terkildsen & Frauke Schnell, How Media Frames Move Public Opinion:
An Analysis of the Women's Movement, 50 POL. RES. Q. 879, 893-94 (1997) (concluding that
framing feminist issues affects citizens' opinions).
96. See Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in Feminist
Legal Theory, 28 CARoozo L. REv. 391, 397-98 (2006) ("How people respond to an issue
depends on how it is presented or 'framed' to them.").
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D. Legal Professionals' Views
The movement for gender-neutral language has had notable ef-
fects in the legal profession. Beginning in the 1980s, a wave of gender
task-force studies appeared in various American jurisdictions, both
state and federal.9 7 These studies examined various aspects of women
and the law, including whether women were treated fairly in law
schools and the legal system. Some of the published reports proposed
the use of gender-neutral language in statutes, judicial opinions, and
other legal writing.98 Some states adopted gender-neutral language in
their constitutions,99 statutes, or other legal discourse, 100 and sections
on gender-neutral language began to appear in legal writing
textbooks. 101
These changes were based first of all on principles of fairness. As
Judge William Hill stated, the legal profession "demands of its practi-
tioners a reverence and respect for the power of the written and spo-
ken word."'1 2 When lawyers' language excludes "more than one-half
97. See Michael B. Shortnacy, Guilty and Gay, A Recipe for Execution in American Court-
rooms: Sexual Orientation as a Toolfor Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 51 Am. U.
L. REv. 309, 320 n.39 (2001) (citing studies); Morrison Torrey, You Call That Education, 19
WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 93, 93 n.1 (2004) (same).
98. See, e.g., OHIO JOINT TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS, FINAL REPORT 6 (1995)
(proposing that gender-neutral language be used in "all rules, canons, jury instructions
and other materials prepared by all participants in the justice system"); Gender Bias Final
Report, supra note 48, at 786 (noting that "most language in court publications [in Virginia]
is gender-neutral," and recommending that "[a]ll court documents be reviewed periodi-
cally for gender-neutral language"); Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58
Mo. L. REv. 485, 658 (1993) (recommending that gender-neutral language be used in
numerous specified publications and that judges and clerks be encouraged to use it); Final
Report: Gender Bias Task Force Report Summary, 6 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 174 (1991) (recom-
mending that jury instructions be written in gender-neutral language).
A New York committee published a pamphlet recommending the use of gender-neu-
tral language in the courts. See NEW YORK STATEJUDICIAL COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS,
FAIR SPEECH: GENDER NEUTRAL LANGUAGE IN THE COURTS 4 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter FAIR
SPEECH PAMPHLET].
99. See Darryl McGrath, Six State Constitutions Use Gender-Neutral Wording, WOMEN'S
ENEws, Dec. 9, 2001, http://www.womensenews.org/aricle.cfm?aid=749 (identifying Cali-
fornia, Hawaii, Maine, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Florida as having incorporated gender-
neutral language in their constitutions).
100. See, e.g., Miscellaneous Docket No. 96-9276: In the Supreme Court of Texas, 60 TEX. B.J.
166, 169 (1997) (recommending thatjudges, lawyers, and court personnel "[u]se gender-
neutral language in all court correspondence and jury instructions").
101. See, e.g., LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION
217-21 (4th ed. 2006); RICHARD K. NEUMANN & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 157-58
(2008); LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: ANALYSIS,
RESEARCH, AND WRITING 681-85 (4th ed. 2006) (each recommending gender-neutral lan-
guage and suggesting techniques for writing it).
102. Hill, supra note 13, at 275.
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of the population," Judge Hill argued, "then surely something is
awry."103 He concluded that avoiding gender bias in legal discourse "is
the right thing to do. 104 Numerous legal commentators have urged
lawyers to use gender-neutral language, 10 5 often stressing that the law
conveys a society's norms, which should be fair to all its members.1
0 6
Few have opposed these views. 10 7 As Judge Judith Kaye stated, "[W] hy
shouldn't lawyers lead others in promoting equality in every way
possible?"' 08
Beyond merely reflecting social changes, legal writers can help
construct norms of fairness that readers internalize cognitively and
perhaps also emotionally and morally. Gender-neutral language can
thus help construct a frame of the legal system that includes and em-
powers both genders.10 9
A second reason for gender-neutral language in the law is that it
is more exact. A New York judicial committee observed that gender-
biased language often sacrifices clarity.' 10 When certain words some-
times mean males, sometimes mean females, and sometimes include
both sexes, confusion may result.111
103. Id. at 276.
104. Id. at 275.
105. See, e.g., TERRi LECLERCQ, EXPERT LEGAL WRITING 127-33 (1995) (suggesting ways
to incorporate gender-neutral language); Burlingame, supra note 27, at 87 (noting that
generic masculine language is "now widely considered inherently sexist"); Richard Bales,
Gender-Neutral Language, 66 BENCH & B. Ky. 40, 40-41 (2002) ("Gender-neutral language
has become both accepted and expected."); Gerald Lebovits, He Said-She Said: Gender-Neu-
tral Writing, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 64, 64 (2002) (stating that those who view the movement for
gender-neutral language as a phase "are wrong").
106. See, e.g., Lebovits, supra note 105, at 64 (arguing that "discriminatory writing per-
petuates discrimination"); see also LECLERCq, supra note 105, at 127, 129 (arguing that law-
yers should be concerned about gender-biased language partly because it "excludes much
of its audience").
107. One of the few unequivocal opponents of gender-neutral language in the law of-
fered two main arguments. The first was based on the aesthetic argument that avoidance of
the generic masculine can lead to awkward phrasing. The second was based on the liberta-
rian argument that authors should be free to choose their language. See Steven Shavell,
Comment, 82 GEO. L.J. 1777, 1777-78 (1994).
Justice Antonin Scalia recently argued that gender-neutral language often requires a
sacrifice to the "second-best circumlocution." SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 67, at 119. At
the insistence of his co-author Garner, however, who favors "invisible gender-neutrality,"
Scalia agreed that they would write their book in gender-neutral language. Id. at 116-17.
108. Kaye, supra note 3, at 2; see also Hill, supra note 13, at 276 (arguing that courts
should use gender-neutral language because of their desire to "include all members of
society as equal participants").
109. See SPENDER, supra note 10, at 139 (stating that language creates a classification
system that shapes individuals' views about reality).
110. FAIR SPEECH PAMPHLET, supra note 98, at 4.
111. SoRRELs, supra note 11, at 2.
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Indeed, legal problems can arise from the use of the generic he. A
statute can be unclear if it uses a feminine pronoun in one part but
only masculine pronouns in others. 112 For example, one woman's sec-
ond-degree murder conviction was reversed because a jury instruction
on self-defense used only the pronoun he.113 The defendant was a five-
foot-four-inch woman on crutches, while the victim, who had
threatened her, was a large, intoxicated man.114 The court held that
use of only the masculine gender in the jury instruction incorrectly
suggested that the woman had the same self-defense options a man
would have, implying that the jurors should use the same standard
they would apply to a fight between men.115
Problems with clarity have been exacerbated by courts' inconsis-
tent treatment of male-linked generic pronouns. Courts sometimes
hold that the generic he refers to only males and sometimes hold that
it refers to both sexes.11 6 In State v. James, the court held that where
the statute about qualifications of petit jurors used the masculine pro-
noun he, the reference was to males only, so the sheriff would have
exceeded his authority had he summoned women for the jury.117 But
in Snyder's Estate v. Denit,"18 the court stated that in statutory construc-
tion, the masculine includes the feminine, but the feminine does not
include the masculine. 119 The court therefore held that a testator who
wrote she must have meant to include only female descendants.120
A third reason to use gender-neutral language is that it benefits
the writer's cause. Whether or not the legal writer personally sees gen-
der-neutral expression as important, "the fact remains that many brief
readers-male and female judges and their staffs-do notice and do
care."'121 Biased language is like a cinder in the eye to many readers,
and "it is decidedly in the brief-writer's self-interest to eliminate the
cinders." 22
112. Petersson, supra note 8, at 109-11.
113. State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
114. Id. at 551.
115. Id. at 558.
116. See Debora Schweikart, The Gender Neutral Pronoun Redefined, 20 WOMEN's L. REP. 1,
6 (1998).
117. 114 A. 553, 555 (N.J. 1921).
118. 72 A.2d 757 (Md. 1950).
119. Id. at 761.
120. Id.
121. Kaye, supra note 3, at 2.
122. Id.
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HI. Gender-Neutral Language in English
A preliminary question for the present study concerns how writ-
ers can frame gender-neutral language in English. A writer who de-
cides to use gender-neutral language has several ways to achieve that
end. They have met with varying degrees of acceptance.
A. Pronouns
Some proposed substitutes for generic masculine pronouns in-
volve significant departures from current usage, employing neolo-
gisms 123 like heris (for her or his), herm (for him or her),124 tey (for he or
she),125 and ter (for him or her).126 Other substitutes would add punctu-
ation to existing words to create forms like s/he, he/she, and (s)he.a27 A
major problem with the latter terms, as William Safire has observed, is
that they are "unspeakable."' 28 Attempts to introduce such neologisms
into wide use have thus far failed.129
Reader expectation theory, which Deborah Tannen connects to
framing theory, 130 helps explain why these neologisms are less than
satisfactory for legal writing. Reader expectation theory holds that
writers communicate more effectively if they use linguistic structures
that readers expect.' 3 ' Linguistic quirks cause readers to stumble,
123. See RICHARD S. NEAL, THE DEFINITIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF SEXIST LAN-
GUAGE: How AND WHY IT IS SOLVED (2003). Under his guidelines for creating new words, see
id. at 17-19, the generic substitute for him and her would be hir. Id. at 20-21. The suffix
-man would become -wan. Id. at 30-31. The word human would thus become huwan. Id. at
42. Neal believes such changes are unobtrusive and likely to be accepted. Id. at 41-43. I
disagree. See infra text accompanying notes 128-134.
124. Todd-Mancillas, supra note 70, at 113.
125. Id.; MILLER & SwiFT, supra note 7, at 130 (1976). For a chronological list of numer-
ous new words proposed as substitutes for the generic masculine pronouns from the years
1850 to 1985, see BARON, supra note 26, at 198-209.
126. Todd-Mancillas, supra note 70, at 113.
127. Treichler & Frank, supra note 66, at 161 (recommending that writers avoid forms
that use slashes or parentheses).
128. WILLIAM SAFIRE, I STAND CORRECTED 179 (1984).
129. CO.BETT, supra note 16, at 223 (stating that because few other languages use such
terms, it is not surprising that these neologisms have not been widely accepted in English);
BARON, supra note 26, at 212 (noting that these contrived epicene pronouns have not been
widely adopted); SoRuREs, supra note 11, at 21 (noting that such forms are not likely to
achieve "widespread acceptance" in the near future).
130. See Tannen, supra note 87, at 14-15.
131. See GEORGE D. GOPEN, EXPECTATIONS: TEACHING FROM THE READER'S PERSPECTIVE,
at xv (2004) (stressing the importance of meeting readers' expectations about language
choice, and explaining that "[i]f we can take good care of most of our readers most of the
time, we are doing a good and great thing"); Tannen, supra note 87, at 14 (referring to the
.power of expectation" in communication).
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breaking their concentration. 3 2 Because the neologisms mentioned
above signal that "a dramatic change" is occurring, some may wish to
use them to shock readers. 133 But the legal writer's purpose is usually
not to shock but to explain or persuade. A dramatic departure from
expectations may divert legal readers from the writer's intended
message.t34
A second solution to the pronoun problem is to use the plural
forms their, they, and them to refer to singular antecedents. This expedi-
ent is now common in informal speech: "If you know anyone who's
going to the meeting, tell them to call me." Some have promoted this
singular they as a solution to the pronoun problem.1 35 However, the
lack of number agreement still causes the reader to stumble and can
create confusion about whether the plural pronoun refers to a generic
person or a group. Its informality and potential for confusion make it
unacceptable in formal writing,136 including legal writing. 137
There are less obtrusive ways to avoid biased pronouns.138 In-
deed, "many graceful solutions are available, some of them quite
simple."13 9
132. GEORGE D. GOPEN, THE SENSE OF STRUCTURE: WRITING FROM THE READER'S PER-
SPECTIVE, at xii (2004) (emphasizing the importance of giving the reader "clear reading
instructions").
133. Todd-Mancillas, supra note 70, at 113.
134. SeeJOSEPH M. WILLIAMS, STYLE: LESSONS IN CLARITY AND GRACE 31 (9th ed. 2007)
(disapproving of he/she and s/he as clumsy); Todd-Mancillas, supra note 70, at 113 (predict-
ing that "neologisms like 'heris' and 'herm' are less likely to find acceptance and perma-
nent adoption than the less contrived alternatives such as pluralizing the subject");
Treichler & Frank, supra note 66, at 161-62 (stating that forms using brackets or parenthe-
ses are "difficult to pronounce and awkward in the possessive").
135. See Bodine, supra note 30, at 177.
136. Treichler & Frank, supra note 66, at 155-56 (noting that because the use of "they
with a singular antecedent is widely condemned within the scholarly community, we do not
advocate its use in writing").
137. ANNE ENQUIST & LAUREL CURRIE OATES, JUST WRITING 206 (2d ed. 2005) (calling
the singular they ungrammatical); Burlingame, supra note 27, at 103-04 (stating that the
use of the singular they "in formal legal writing risks a significant loss of persuasiveness,"
and may lead some to "stigmatize the lawyer as illiterate").
138. For lists of suggestions on ho to avoid generic masculine pronouns, see DU-
MOND, supra note 93, at 25; BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE
800-01 (2d ed. 2001); MILLER & SwIFT, supra note 7, at 158-64; ENQUIST & OATES, supra
note 137, at 148-50; Treichler & Frank, supra note 66, at 153-80; Burlingame, supra note
27, at 99-108; Richard B. Klein, Make It A "Bief, "8 VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS & TACTICS 363,
366 (1990); and Bales, supra note 105, at 40-41.
139. Treichler & Frank, supra note 66, at 141; see also DUMOND, supra note 93, at 1
("Writing so that you won't exclude or provoke half your readers need not be difficult.");
SoRRELs, supra note 11, at 3 ("Natural, graceful, and grammatically correct nonsexist pat-
terns come relatively easily to one who has a commitment to seek them.").
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1. The writer can change an antecedent noun to the plural so
that a plural pronoun is appropriate. Thus "A lawyer should file his
briefs on time" can become the gender-neutral "Lawyers should file
their briefs on time."
2. The writer can recast the sentence to avoid the pronoun alto-
gether: "It is important to file briefs on time." Sometimes the articles a
or the or the word who 140 will help: "A lawyer should file a brief on
time," or "A lawyer who files a brief late may be sanctioned."
3. The passive voice may eliminate the need for a pronoun:
"Briefs should be filed on time." Using the passive voice, of course,
can create new difficulties, because passive constructions are often
wordy, and the lack of an identified actor tends to make a sentence
vague. Therefore, commentators suggest using this alternative
sparingly.1 41
4. Alternating pronouns is another way to avoid the generic mas-
culine: "If a lawyer does not file his brief on time, ajudge may lose her
temper." However, this can distract and confuse a reader trying to fol-
low a discussion by tracing the participants' gender. Respondents in a
study by psychologists Madson and Shoda found this option cumber-
some, 142 but Treicher and Frank recommend it "if done carefully. '143
A careful approach would avoid the hazard of unintentionally engag-
ing gender stereotypes, which occurred when one speaker used he for
good students and she for a student who was hesitant to ask
questions. 144
5. Paired pronouns can also avoid the generic masculine: "A law-
yer should file his or her brief on time." Paired pronouns have the
advantage of reflecting reality, and Madson and Shoda found that
readers preferred this form over alternating pronouns. 145 Some find
this construction clumsy, 14 6 but it is worth noting that even the term
clumsy may have some frame-based normative content in this context,
140. See Treichler & Frank, supra note 66, at 166 (suggesting the use of relative pro-
nouns, which have no grammatical gender).
141. See, e.g., id. at 172-73 (stating that the passive voice "can produce less than felici-
tous results," and recommending that writers use it to avoid the generic masculine only
when there is not a "more concise and graceful solution").
142. Madson & Shoda, supra note 79, at 284.
143. Treichler & Frank, supra note 66, at 160.
144. Id. at 161.
145. Madson & Shoda, supra note 79, at 284 (reporting data showing that readers pre-
ferred paired pronouns over alternating pronouns).
146. See Burlingame, supra note 27, at 99 (offering a phonological explanation for why
the pairs seem clumsy); SORRELS, supra note 11, at 20 (advising that, to avoid "distractions
and inefficiency," writers should avoid using repeated paired pronouns).
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because people's frames have incorporated biased male-linked
pronouns.
6. Repeating the noun can avoid the need for a pronoun alto-
gether: "If a lawyer does not file a brief on time, the lawyer may be
sanctioned." 147 A disadvantage of this option is that it may be both
repetitive and wordy.
7. Similarly, using a synonym can avoid the need for a pronoun:
"The clerk keeps the court calendar. That is the person who can
schedule your hearing. ' 148 This option can also result in wordiness.
Moreover, it must be undertaken carefully, because it risks confusing
readers. Referring to the same person or concept with different termi-
nology can undermine clarity, which is especially important in legal
writing.149
Because the last five methods can be cumbersome, especially on
repeated use, commentators advise using them with care.1 50 But taken
together, the above suggestions provide writers with many possible
unobtrusive solutions. 1'51 Where a sentence is deftly constructed, the
reader may never know that the writer consciously avoided using gen-
der-biased pronouns.
B. Nouns
Writers can also find graceful ways to change gender-biased
nouns and noun phrases. For example, for the pseudo-generic mascu-
line noun man, the writer can use humans or persons: "Humans
breastfeed their young." Where words gratuitously identify the sex of a
referent, a writer can choose neutral alternatives, for example, by re-
placing waitress with server and policeman with police officer. One scholar
noted that compounds including the word man are especially resistant
to change, perhaps because not all of them can be changed according
147. See, e.g., MILLER & SwirF, supra note 9, at 43.
148. See FAIR SPEECH PAMPHLET, supra note 98, at 8 (suggesting the replacement of a
pronoun with a synonym).
149. See BARBARA CHILD, DRAFTING LEGAL DOCUMENTS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 319
(2d ed. 1992) ("[C] onstant variation, sometimes derogatorily called 'elegant variation,' can
be irritating and distracting in any context. In legal drafting, it is totally unacceptable be-
cause the shifts make a reader wonder whether there is some hidden difference in mean-
ing or reference."); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 67, at 107 (stating that in brief writing,
"the same word should be used to refer to a particular key concept").
150. See, e.g., Treichler & Frank, supra note 66, at 159 (recommending sparing use of he
or she); id. at 160-61 (urging care in alternating pronouns); Burlingame, supra note 27, at
105 (recommending sparing use of the passive voice).
151. Bryan Garner, for example, contends that gender-neutrality can be invisible. See
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 67, at 116.
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to the same formula. 152 For example, weatherman can become weather
forecaster, but fireman becomes firefighter.153 Still, the motivated writer
can find suitable phrasing, perhaps by consulting one of the many lists
of substitutes for gender-biased nouns. 154
Where the gender-biased language arises from the writer's own
choice, a writer can cultivate sensitivity to the problem. Avoiding non-
parallel phrasing like man and wife and patronizing wording like the
gentle sex requires that the writer recognize the bias in such terms and
seek gender-neutral alternatives. Husband and wife is an appropriate
parallel phrase, and the gentle sex can be replaced with a word like
women or females, depending on the context.
IV. The Study
A. Study Design
To determine whether federal appellate judges are using gender-
neutral language, my research assistant and I collected several kinds of
data. First, we examined recent opinions authored by a larger sample
ofjudges ("the Larger Sample") to determine whether they used gen-
der-neutral pronoun pairs. Second, we read a smaller sample of those
opinions ("the Smaller Sample") more closely, checking for instances
of gender-neutral and gender-biased language. Third, we compared
data from the years 1965 and 2006.155 The methodology for each of
these portions of the study is described below.
B. Methodology and Findings
1. The Larger Sample
a. Methodology
We collected data on the use of gender-neutral pronoun pairs in
the opinions of federal appellate judges. We chose this group because
it is a population of manageable size with notable influence in the
legal field. For the Larger Sample, we identified all female judges, in-
cluding senior judges, who were sitting on the United States courts of
appeals in June 2007 and who had issued opinions in the previous
152. Cooper, supra note 60, at 11.
153. Id. at 11-12.
154. See, e.g., LECLERCQ, supra note 105, at 131; FAIR SPEECH PAMPHLET, supra note 98, at
5-6; MILLER & SWIr, supra note 9, at 109-13; Chew & Kelley-Chew, supra note 5, at 677-78;
Carolyn Korsmeyer, The Hidden Joke: Generic Uses of Masculine Terminology, in SEXIST LmN,-
GUAGE, supra note 42, at 122.
155. See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
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eighteen months that were available on Westlaw. We also included
male judges, partly because studies in other populations have found
that female participants were more receptive to inclusive language
than males were, 156 and we wanted to see whether that held true for
federal appellate judges. We therefore paired each female with a male
judge from the same court whose birth date was closest to hers. We
used birth dates because some previous studies have shown that age
affects attitudes toward gender-neutral language, with older subjects
being more receptive to it,157 so we wanted a similar range of ages for
each sex. We also thought that persons born around the same time
were likely to have been exposed to similar societal attitudes about
gender and language during their formative years. The 48 pairs con-
stituted a total of 96 judges in the Larger Sample. In June 2007, the
total number of active and senior federal appellate judges was 255.158
We gathered data through a Westlaw search of the federal court
of appeals ("cta") database for opinions by the judges in our sample
dated from January 1, 2006, through June 30, 2007. This yielded a
total of 4721 opinions, which we searched for gender-neutral pronoun
pairs he or she, him or her, and his or her.159 We examined each instance
of these phrases. If a phrase was part of a quotation or a close para-
phrase from another source, we did not count it, because it did not
represent a choice of wording by the judge being studied. We ac-
knowledge that there was some gray area in making these determina-
tions. For example, one lengthy and commonly cited immigration
statute is written in gender-neutral language.1 60 The drafters accom-
plished this principally through repeating nouns, 161 but the statute
also includes some pronoun pairs. 162 Where a judge used a pronoun
pair in referring to this statute, but not in a direct quotation, we made
156. Parks & Roberton, supra note 15, at 233-34 (2004) (citing studies that "have con-
sistently revealed that women are more supportive of nonsexist (inclusive) language than
men"). Another study showed that subjects' attitudes toward women "partially mediate[]
the gender effect on attitudes toward sexist language." Id. at 238.
157. See Parks & Roberton, supra note 11, at 402 (citing studies).
158. 496 F.3d at vii-xiv (listing then-current federal judges).
159. We also searched for each pronoun pair with the feminine pronoun first: she or he,
her or him, and hers or his. But when we found only two instances of those pairs in the sample
for the year 2006, we dropped it from our formulation. We also dropped the phrase his or
hers because it was so infrequent.
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2000).
161. See, e.g., id. § 1231 (a) (7) (A). ("[T]he alien cannot be removed due to the refusal
of all countries designated by the alien or under this section to receive the alien.").
162. See, e.g., id. § 1231 (i) (3) (B) (iii) ("[A]t the time he or she was taken into custody
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a judgment from the context whether that language should be attrib-
uted to the judge or to the statute's drafters.
b. Results
After recording the data for each judge in the Larger Sample, we
then expressed the subjects' use of gender-neutral pronoun pairs as
percentages of the total number of opinions for each group, as shown
in Table 1.
Table 1. The Larger Sample-Occurrences of Gender-Neutral
Pronoun Pairs in a Sample of Opinions Dated from January
1, 2006, to June 30, 2007
Female Male Total
Occurrences of: Judges Judges Occurrences
his or her 201 174 375
him or her 26 19 45
he or she 141 116 257
Total Occurrences 368 309 677
Total Cases 2439 2282 4721
Percentage 15.09% 13.54% 14.34%
The Larger Sample covered 96judges' use of gender-neutral pro-
noun pairs in 4721 federal appellate opinions. Initially, certain caveats
about the data must be acknowledged. Paired pronoun use is only one
method to avoid gender-biased pronouns; a writer may accomplish
that end through various other methods. But those methods, de-
scribed above, 163 are not easily discovered through computer
searches. For example, when a noun is changed to the plural so the
pronoun they is appropriate instead of a gendered singular pronoun, a
computer cannot distinguish this use of they from others that are not
related to gender neutrality. Nor can the computer identify more cre-
ative restructuring of syntax to avoid a gender-biased word choice.
Moreover, many opinions do not include any generic pronoun refer-
ences, 164 so they present little occasion to use either gender-biased or
gender-neutral pronouns. These caveats make it plain that a tally of a
judge's gender-neutral pronoun usage is not a dispositive measure of
that judge's commitment to avoid gender bias. Still, the aggregate
data in this study show a trend toward gender neutrality through
163. See discussion supra Part III.
164. See infra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
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many appearances of gender-neutral pronoun pairs. As Table 1 shows,
we found 677 of these pairs among the 4721 cases we reviewed.
The degree to which individual judges used these pairs varied.
Among the women, ten judges used no gender-neutral pronoun pairs,
and the highest numbers of pronoun pairs appeared in the opinions
of Judges Sonia Sotomayor (56), Maryanne Barry (38), and Sharon
Prost (32). Among the men, ten judges used no gender-neutral pro-
noun pairs, and the highest numbers of pairs appeared in the opin-
ions of Judges Eric Clay (47), Robert Sack (33), and Ronald Gilman
(33).
In reviewing the pronoun pairs in the Larger Sample, we came
across some phrasing that suggested judges had made conscious ef-
forts to use gender-neutral language. In a case involving a male plain-
tiff, Judge Robert Sack added a bracketed he or she to a quotation,
stating that a party requesting a preliminary injunction must show
"that [he or she] will be irreparably harmed."'165 The original source
for the quotation used the word it.166 Similarly, in one case, Judge
Roger Gregory wrote "[his or her] discipline" 167 when the original
source said "'[the relevant] discipline."' 1 68 In another case, Judge
Damon Keith said that a court need not "ask a defendant whether he
or she understands" a waiver,' 69 although the referenced rule did not
include the pronoun pair.'70
The data also show a small difference between younger and older
judges. We divided the female and male groups in half by birth year 17'
and found the use of gender-neutral pronoun pairs expressed as a
percentage of total cases was slightly higher for the younger group
(15.6%) than for the older group (14%). However, a linear
probability model shows that this difference was not statistically signifi-
cant as measured by the t test.' 72 Likewise, the difference between the
165. Lusk v. Viii. of Cold Spring, 475 F.3d 480, 485 (2d Cir. 2007).
166. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 348-49 (2d Cir. 2003)
(emphasis added).
167. East Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. 7.74 Acres in Wythe County, Va., 228 F. App'x 323,
328 (4th Cir. 2007).
168. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999).
169. United States v. Broom, 207 F. App'x 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2006).
170. FED. R. GRIM. P. 11.
171. Female judges in the older half were born in 1945 or earlier; male judges in the
older half were born in 1943 or earlier.
172. The t test is a standard test that measures the statistical significance of data. A
difference between two points of data is considered meaningful-statistically significant-
if it is large enough that it is unlikely to be due to chance. See LLOYD JAISINGH, STATISTICS
FOR THE Um-IRLY CONFUSED 272, 274 (2000).
[Vol. 43
GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE
women and men as a whole (shown in Table 1) was not statistically
significant. Among the subjects of this study, then, both younger and
older judges and female and male judges used gender-neutral pro-
noun pairs to a statistically similar degree.
We did, however, find a significant difference among the circuits.
As shown in Table 2, three circuit courts showed a statistically signifi-
cant difference in the use of gender-neutral pronoun pairs. The
judges in the samples from the Fifth and D.C. Circuits were signifi-
cantly less likely to use gender-neutral pronoun pairs than were judges
in the entire sample, while judges from the Second Circuit were more
likely to use gender-neutral pairs.
Table 2. Judges' Use of Gender-Neutral Pronoun Pairs, by Circuit
Circuit Coefficient t Statistics
cl -0.0698 -0.3983
c2 0.2210* 1.7697
c3 -0.0726 -0.5870
c4 -0.1858 -1.3898
c5 -0.2143* -1.7071
c6 -0.0417 -0.3553
c7 -0.1571 -1.2543
c8 -0.2264 -1.2918
c9 -0.1499 -1.3431
c10 -0.2108 -1.6053
c11 -0.1948 -1.4896
FED 0.7139 0.9280
DC -0.2223* -1.6976
* Statistically significant at the .10 level 173
We also found a notable difference in the use of gender-neutral
pronoun pairs between appointees of Democratic presidents and ap-
pointees of Republican presidents, as shown in Table 3.174
173. Significance was calculated using a student t table with 83 degrees of freedom.
174. In an effort to gather qualitative information about the study's data, we attempted
to contact several judges and law clerks to ask about their policies. Most declined to talk
with us, referring us instead to their published opinions. One female judge who did talk
with me volunteered that she tries to "reflect the fact that the world is composed of persons
of two sexes." Interview with Anonymous Federal Appellate Judge (Feb. 7, 2008) (notes on
file with author). This particular judge will use the phrase he or she if she can do so grace-
fully, but if a sentence becomes tangled, she will use either he or she. We had recorded no
gender-neutral pronoun pairs for her in the Larger Sample. Nevertheless, this judge indi-
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Table 3. Judges' Use of Gender-Neutral Pairs, Classified by Political
Party of the Appointing President
Democratic Appointees Republican Appointees
Women Average: 9.42 Average: 5.2
N = 28 n = 20
Men Average: 10.27 Average: 3.19
N = 22 n = 26
Average numbers of gender-neutral pronoun pairs in the Larger Sample
2. The Smaller Sample
a. Methodology
The suggestions for writing gender-neutral language, discussed
above in Part III, illustrate the varied choices available to a judge who
wishes to avoid gender-biased language. Because some of those
choices cannot readily be found by a computer, my research assistant
and I read the Smaller Sample to check for them. We chose this sub-
section of the Larger Sample by listing each female judge by circuit
and in alphabetical order within the circuit; we chose every eighth
judge from this list, for a total of six female judges.175 We then added
the male judges we had previously paired with those women. 176 For
these twelve judges (six pairs), we read the newest five opinions dated
before June 30, 2007, that were shown on Westlaw as appearing in
either the Federal Reporter or the Federal Appendix, 77 for a total of
sixty opinions. We recorded all uses of gender-biased and gender-neu-
tral language that we could identify. As with the Larger Sample, we
did not count pronouns that appeared in quotations and close para-
phrases from other sources. Making these determinations again in-
cated that she was alert to the problem of gender bias. Gender neutrality may be reflected
in her opinions in ways that we did not measure.
175. This Smaller Sample was comprised of Judge Jane Roth of the Third Circuit;
Judge Priscilla Owen of the Fifth Circuit; Judge Diane Sykes of the Seventh Circuit; Judge
Susan Graber of the Ninth Circuit; Judge Mary Beck Briscoe of the Tenth Circuit; and
Judge Judith Rogers of the D.C. Circuit.
176. This Smaller Sample was comprised of Judge Walter Stapleton of the Third Cir-
cuit; Judge Carl Stewart of the Fifth Circuit; Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Cir-
cuit; Judge Richard Clifton of the Ninth Circuit; Judge Michael Murphy of the Tenth
Circuit; and Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit.
177. We did not include opinions identified on June 30, 2007, as "slip opinions," even
though we recognized that they might later appear in the Federal Reporter or the Federal
Appendix.
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volved some gray area, because not all methods of eliminating gender-
biased language are clearly identifiable. 178
b. Results
This reading illustrated an intuitive point: only some opinions
present issues about gender-neutral language. An example of a case
that did not is United States v. Rankin.y 9 James Rankin had been con-
victed of manufacturing and transporting explosive materials, and the
government's appeal was based on issues arising from his sentenc-
ing. 18 0 The opinion did not mention any general legal principles that
included gendered pronouns, nor did it include any ready opportuni-
ties to use gender-biased nouns like mailman. The opinion's masculine
pronouns referred to Rankin himself and were thus not gender bi-
ased.18' Feminine pronouns referred to a female officer. 18 2 This is il-
lustrative of the many opinions that contained neither gender-biased
nor obviously gender-neutral language.
A writer does confront a choice about pronoun gender when us-
ing a pronoun in a general statement that refers to a person of un-
specified sex. In such situations, the former convention was to use a
male pronoun as a generic, as in this sentence: "A judge should keep
order in his courtroom." A check for such gendered pronouns in the
Smaller Sample revealed forty-three of them in general statements.
Table 4. The Smaller Sample-Occurrences of Biased and Gender-
Neutral Terms183
n = 60 cases
Generic Use of
Gender- a Gendered
Neutral Biased Pronoun Fitting Gender-
Pronoun Pronoun the Sex of a Neutral Noun Biased Noun
Use Use Relevant Person Use Use
9 11 32 1 0
As shown in Table 4, thirty-two of the gendered pronouns oc-
curred in statements that related to particular persons. Thirty of those
178. See Todd-Mancillas, supra note 70, at 113 (noting that it will not be obvious where
a writer has consciously used a plural noun in order to use the plural "they").
179. 487 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2007).
180. Id. at 230-31.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 230.
183. The sixty opinions consisted of five recent opinions each by six female and six
male judges. For further explanation, see supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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pronouns were masculine. For example, in a case involving a male
defendant, Judge Priscilla Owen referred to the required analysis by
stating, "a defendant cannot fail to invoke [certain] factors in support
of his motion."1 8 4 Two of the gendered pronouns were feminine, used
by Judge Carl Stewart and Judge Harry Edwards to state general prin-
ciples that applied to women.18 5 Because of their close relation to ac-
tual persons in the cases, we did not classify these pronouns as clearly
biased. Using a gendered pronoun this way-as part of a general state-
ment that applies to a particular individual in the case-may be a rea-
sonable way to use a third-person pronoun without suggesting that the
masculine is the norm. We therefore classified these thirty-two occur-
rences separately.
We did find eleven clearly biased pronouns. Two were masculine
pronouns in a general statement in Decatur Ventures, LLC, v. Daniel,186
where Judge Frank Easterbrook stated, "[A] professional owes a duty
of care only to his client plus any third party who the professional
knows will see and rely on any opinion he renders." 1 87 As discussed
above, it may be reasonable for a writer to express this kind of general
principle with a pronoun of the same gender as a relevant person.
However, the professional in question in Decatur Ventures was a
woman.188 We recorded this as gender-biased language.
A second example of biased pronouns appeared in a case con-
cerning student transfers to other school districts. 189 Although there
was no particular male student under discussion, in a single sentence
Judge Mary Briscoe used masculine pronouns four times: "If a student
transfers to a school district in which he is not a resident, he cannot
compete in athletics for one year, unless the transfer is due to a bona
fide change of residence by his parents, or he can demonstrate a legit-
184. United States v. Washington, 480 F.3d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 2007).
185. Greenwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 486 F.3d 840, 843 (5th Cir. 2007)
(stating, in a case where the plaintiff was a woman: "An employee merely alleging sickness
as the reason for her absence does not automatically provide sufficient FMLA-notice.");
Jochims v. NLRB, 480 F.3d 1161, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating, in a case where it was
alleged that a woman was a supervisor: "[Slupervisory authority is not conferred on an
employee merely by vesting her with a title").
186. 485 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2007).
187. Id. at 390.
188. Id.
189. Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 483 F.3d 1025,
1027 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
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imate hardship."190 The controlling statute is written in gender-neu-
tral language. 191
We also looked for gender-biased nouns in the sixty cases, but the
Smaller Sample was notably lacking in gender-biased terms like mail-
man or founding fathers. And as in the Larger Sample, we found in-
stances where judges apparently intentionally framed points in
gender-neutral language. In a case where a married couple petitioned
for asylum, Judge Walter Stapleton used feminine pronouns in gen-
eral statements; for example, "the alien must demonstrate that she is
unwilling or unable to return to her home country .... ,192 Judge
Priscilla Owen used the phrase he or she in a general statement about
injured persons, 19 3 and Judge Judith Rogers used the pair his or her.194
In another instance, in discussing whether expert testimony should be
required on a certain point, Judge Harry Edwards mentioned what
"lay persons" can appropriately be expected to know.195 This is a gen-
der-neutral counterpart for the term laymen, which was used (along
with its singular form) in fifty-three federal appellate cases in 1965, as
shown in Figure 1 and discussed below.
Other judges may have chosen to avoid gender-biased language
in ways that we could not definitively identify. For example, in an
opinion by Judge Jane Roth that concerned fiduciary obligations, 196 in
several places she used the plural noun fiduciaries,197 thus making a
plural pronoun appropriate. Similarly, Judge Michael Murphy re-
peated the phrase third party several times, perhaps in order to avoid a
gendered pronoun. 198 It seems likely that other judges avoided bias
through deft phrasing that we could not detect.
Although the Smaller Sample produced numbers too small for
meaningful statistical analysis, the low amount of biased phrasing in
these cases suggests that many judges are framing their opinions in
gender-neutral language. It further suggests that more blatantly bi-
190. Id.
191. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 8-103.2 (West Supp. 2006).
192. Komarovas v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 219 Fed. App'x 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
193. Evans v. Ford Motor Co., 484 F.3d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 2007).
194. Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
195. Briggs v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
196. Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 482 F.3d 225, 226 (3d Cir. 2007).
197. Id. at 233.
198. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2007) (including phrasing
such as, "[v]alid third party consent can arise either through the third party's actual au-
thority or the third party's apparent authority").
Winter 2009] GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
ased wording, like referring to the "delicacy" of women, 199 has now
become rare or nonexistent in federal appellate opinions.
3. Changes Between 1965 and 2006
a. Methodology
We also examined whether judges' use of gender-neutral lan-
guage has changed over time. To examine this, my research assistant
and I chose the year 1965 as a benchmark because it immediately pre-
ceded the late 1960s, when feminists in the United States began their
movement for gender-neutral language. 200 We used the year 2006 for
comparison because it was the last complete year at the time we col-
lected the data. We conducted a computer search of all federal court
of appeals cases for both years, 201 searching for opinions that in-
cluded the same pronoun pairs we counted in the Larger Sample. We
also counted cases using the less common phrases himself or herself and
herself or himself, which we had not examined in the Larger Sample
because of their infrequency, and cases from both years that used se-
lected nouns, as shown in Figure 1 and Table 5.
Unlike our approach to the Larger Sample, we did not review
each pronoun pair identified by this search; we simply recorded the
gross number of cases that included gender-neutral pronoun pairs.
We did, however, review occurrences of certain nouns that have differ-
ent uses, some of them relevant and some not relevant to this study.
We checked the references to founders, counting them only where the
term referred to founders of the United States. We also checked uses
of mailman and postal worker(s) and did not count cases where they
appeared as parts of proper names, because those did not represent
choices by judges.
b. Results
A comparison of 1965 opinions with those from 2006 shows a dra-
matic increase in the use of gender-neutral language over that period.
199. See discussion supra note 49 and accompanying text.
200. See CAMERON, supra note 22, at 9 (identifying "pressures to look at [gender-biased]
language which arose, roughly, during the late 1960s and 1970s"); Betty Lou Dubois &
Isabel Crouch, Linguistic Disruption: He/She, S/He, He or She, and He-She, in WOMEN AND
LANGUAGE IN TRANSITION 28, 29 (Joyce Penfield ed., 1987) ("[B]y far the majority of writers
before the 1970s did not worry about the use of pronouns.").
201. Interestingly, the total number of opinions for 2006 varied slightly depending on
the date when we checked the database. West's research attorneys were unable to explain
the cause of this difference. The totals reported for the year 2006 in this Article were
recorded from searches conducted on November 20, 2007.
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Between 1965 and 2006, the total number of reported cases from the
federal courts of appeals increased from 3661 to 28,086,202 or 667%.
At the same time, use of the three gender-neutral pronoun pairs he or
she, him or her, and his or her showed a much greater increase, from 55
to 2361, or 4192%. Figure 1 shows cases using the identified terms
expressed as percentages 20 3 of the total number of cases.
Figure 1
9
C[8- 84
7
6 7--
5 -- 0 1965 n=3661
4 ; 03 2006 n=28,086
E777
2
.21.2
"he or she," reasonable reasonable policeman police layman or
"him or her," man person or officer layment
"his or her" policemen
Terms Used
On average, federal appellate judges in 2006 were much more
likely than judges in 1965 to use these pronoun pairs. The difference
was statistically significant at the 1% level. 20 4 Comparisons of noun
phrases also show a trend toward gender neutrality. 20 5 The increase in
use of the terms reasonable person20 6 and police officer was statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level. In the same period, there was a proportional
decrease in cases using the gender-biased terms reasonable man and
layman and its plural laymen, which were significantly less likely to be
used in 2006 than in 1965. This comparison was also made at the 10%
level of significance.
202. The totals for both years include cases with no opinion attributed to a particular
judge-for example, per curiam and memorandum opinions. We did not attempt to iden-
tify and separate such cases from the totals.
203. Some of the terms shown as occurring at the 0% level did appear a few times, but
not enough to equal 1%.
204. Under a two-sample proportion test, the Z-score was equal to 26.50803.
205. We did not examine use of the term reasonable woman, because using that term is
more than a linguistic choice. It reflects a different legal standard, which is outside the
scope of this Article. For a discussion of the "reasonable woman" standard for sexual har-
assment, see Chew & Kelley-Chew, supra note 5, at 672-75.
206. This finding comports with Chew and Kelley-Chew's finding that, partly because
of the debate over the legal standard, federal judges now use the term reasonable person
(instead of reasonable man) 96% of the time. Id. at 672.
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The other terms we compared occurred too infrequently for
meaningful statistical analysis. But as Table 5 shows, the number of
cases including the gender-biased terms founding fathers and mail-
man207 or postman remained essentially static despite the large increase
in cases. The gender-biased mankind increased modestly, but not in
proportion to the overall increase in cases. Meanwhile, there were in-
creases in the gender-neutral terms founders, mail carrier, postal worker,
and variations of lay persons.208 There were no instances of founding
mothers in either year, and only one instance of humankind. Altogether,
although the numbers in Table 5 are small, they suggest a trend to-
ward gender-neutral language. At the same time, though, they show
that biased language still continues to appear, indicating a need for
continued progress.
Table 5. Occurrences of Less Common Terms
1965 and 2006 Federal Appellate Cases
in Westlaw Search of
Terms 1965 Cases 2006 Cases
himself or herself 1 152
herself or himself 0 3
mankind 8 21
humankind 0 1
founding fathers 2 2
founders [of the United States] 1 9
founding mothers 0 0
mailman or postman 3 6
mail carrier 5 15
postal worker 0 31
layperson, laypersons, lay person, lay persons, or lay people 3 110
Total number of cases 3661 28,086
Conclusion
Professionals in many fields recognize that gender-biased lan-
guage makes women invisible and constructs an inaccurate world.
While some commentators express concerns that gender-neutral lan-
guage will be awkward or annoying, language experts identify graceful
207. The term Mailman appeared in some cases as a proper name. We did not include
those cases in our total.
208. The term Postal Worker appeared in some cases as part of the name of a union. We
did not include those cases in our total.
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ways to surmount these obstacles. The use of gender-neutral language
has increased in many fields, including the legal profession.
This Article began with a question: Are judges using gender-neu-
tral language? This study's data answer that question: they are. Federal
appellate opinions now include significantly more of it than in the
benchmark year, 1965. Many federal appellate judges, both women
and men, are taking care to choose gender-neutral language, thus
bringing the law closer to its broad goal of being fair to all citizens.
Since 1965, which predated the movement for gender-neutral lan-
guage, the use of gender-neutral pronouns has increased significantly,
as has the use of most of the gender-neutral noun phrases we
examined.
Our data led us to an optimistic conclusion about federal appel-
late judges. 209 The dramatic increase in gender-neutral pronoun pairs
since 1965 was robustly significant, and pronoun pairs are only one
solution to the pronoun problem. Still, some biased nouns and pro-
nouns continue to appear in the federal appellate opinions. Interest-
ingly, we noted that appointees of Republican presidents used fewer
gender-neutral pronoun pairs than Democratic appointees. These
points suggest a continued need for consciousness-raising about gen-
der-neutral language.
This study's data also suggest possibilities for further research. Fu-
ture studies of federal appellate judges in the United States could doc-
ument whether the trend toward gender-neutral language continues.
Data from other American courts or from foreign courts would also
lead to instructive comparisons.
Frames shift and adapt over time, and the potential for re-fram-
ing always exists. Judges can continue the trend away from gender-
biased language, thus framing the law in a more inclusive way. Lawyers
can assume a role in this effort. Both principles of fairness and a de-
sire to win should prompt them to consider adopting inclusive word-
ing. When they file documents with the federal courts of appeals,
there is a good chance that their readers-whether female or male,
judges or staff members-will be attuned to gender-neutral language.
Biased language may be a cinder in the eye210 to such readers, dimin-
209. But see Chew & Kelley-Chew, supra note 5, at 668, 672 (concluding from an exami-
nation of noun phrases in various legal documents that progress toward gender-neutral
language in the legal profession was disappointing, but noting that some "gender-neutral
word options are now widely used in the legal community").
210. Kaye, supra note 3, at 2.
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ishing a briefs effectiveness. If both judges and lawyers consciously
shift their frames toward gender neutrality, their efforts will positively
influence how litigants and the public look at gender and the law.
